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COMMENTS
LIABILITY OF WISCONSIN MUNICIPALITIES
FOR NUISANCE
One of the traditionally troublesome areas of the law is that of
the tort liability of municipal corporations. The confusion is prob-
ably caused by the rather artificial dichotomy between the munici-
pality in its corporate or proprietary capacity and the municipality
in its governmental capacity. When the municipality is acting in
the latter capacity (or performing a governmental function) it is gen-
erally held to be immune from tort liability.' When the municipality
is acting in its corporate or proprietary capacity it enjoys no special
immunity. However, there is a split of authority between jurisdic-
tions as to whether a given municipal function is corporate or gov-
ernmental. For example, Wisconsin regards the maintenance of city
parks and swimming pools as governmental. 2 Other jurisdictions
regard these functions as corporate, while apparently using the same
test for determining whether a function is governmental or cor-
porate.
The importance of making the distinction was brought out in
Nemet v. City of Kenosha.3 A young man who could not swim was
drowned on a municipal bathing beach when he fell into a trench
dug from the beach for a waterworks intake pipe. In maintaining
the bathing beach the city was acting in a governmental capacity
and seemingly would not be held liable for the drowning of a person
using the beach. However, in furnishing water to private consumers
the city was acting in its proprietary capacity. The construction of
this excavation, without giving notice of the existing danger, was
held to constitute a nuisance, and the city was thus liable for the
drowning caused thereby.
Another reason for confusion in the area of municipal tort lia-
bility is the attempt by the courts to circumvent the doctrine of
governmental immunity of municipalities. 4
It is the purpose of this article to consider one area of tort law
which has made somewhat of an inroad upon the doctrine of mu-
nicipal immunity-nuisance. An attempt will be made to demon-
strate the present status of Wisconsin law concerning the liability
1 18 McQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, §53.24.
2 Skirs v. Port Washington, 223 Wis. 51, 269 N.W. 556 (1936) ; Bernstein v. City
of Milwaukee, 158 Wis. 576, 149 N.W. 381 (1914) ; Hoepner v. City of Eau
Claire, 264 Wis. 608, 60 N.W. 2d 392 (1953).
3 169 Wis. 379, 172 N.W. 711 (1919).
4 "The whole matter of municipal liability for torts is in such confusion and
uncertainty due to the efforts of the courts to limit what has been called "the
state's 'lordly prerogative of wrongdoing' that it may well be given considera-
tion by the legislature." Lindemeyer v. City of Milwaukee, 241 Wis. 637, 644,
6 N.W. 2d 653 (1942).
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of municipalities for nuisance, how it has developed, and possible
trends in the area as evidenced by recent decisions. It is recognized
that there is particular difficulty in proving the existence of a
nuisance, but one of the ends of this article will be to show the ad-
vantages of taking the increased burden, in the appropriate case,
of proving the existence of nuisance as the causal factor in an action
against a municipal corporation.
This discussion will presuppose the existence of a nuisance cre-
ated or maintained by the municipality and consider under what
circumstances the municipality may be held liable in Wisconsin. As
a basis for discussion a definition of nuisance approved by the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin will be used:
As commonly used, it [nuisance] connotes a condition or
activity which unduly interferes with the use of land or of a
public place. Conduct which interferes solely with the use of
a relatively small area of private land is tortious but not
criminal and is called a private nuisance. Conduct which inter-
feres with the use of a public place or with activities of an
entire community is called a public nuisance. This is criminal,
and is also tortious to those persons who are specially harmed
by it.5
The nuisance itself is the condition or activity achieved; it can
be prompted by conduct of municipal employees which may be
either negligent or intentional,6 and there are situations where there
dan be liability regardless of negligence or intent.7
Wisconsin adheres to the common law rule that a municipality
is immune from liability for negligence in the performance of a
governmental function. However, where that negligence precipitates
a nuisance in fact, which causes damage, the municipality will not
always enjoy immunity. In considering whether a municipality
should be immune from liability for nuisance in a given situation,
the Wisconsin Court appears to make no distinction between so-
called private nuisance and special harm from a public nuisance.
The court has excluded "attractive nuisance" from the legal con-
cept of nuisance in fact; it is more properly a phase of negligence."
I. DEVELOPMENT OF NUISANCE LIABILITY
OF WISCONSIN MUNICIPALITIES
A. Governor to governed relationship
Although Wisconsin has held to the common law doctrine of
5 Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 545, 78 N.W. 2d 580 (1956) ; also
quoted in part in: Hartung v. Milwaukee County, 2 Wis. 2d 269, 284, 87 N.W.
2d 799 (1957) ; Krejci v. Lojeski, 275 Wis. 20, 24, 80 N.W. 2d 794 (1957).
6 Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., supra note 5.
7 Winchell v. City of Waukesha, 110 Wis. 101, 85 N.W. 668 (1901) ; Hasslinger
v. Cillage of Hartland, 234 Wis. 201, 290 N.W. 647 (1940); Briggson v. City
of Viroqua, 264 Wis. 47, 58 N.W. 2d 546 (1953).
8 Flamingo v. City of Waukesha, 262 Wis. 219, 55 N.W. 2d 24 (1952).
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municipal immunity from tort liability when the municipality is
acting in a governmental capacity, broad language in several early
cases indicated that there could be no immunity where the munici-
pality had created or maintained a nuisance.9 In Harper v. City of
Milwaukee ° an agent of the city blocked the flow of water along
a gutter causing the water to back up and flood the plaintiff's cellar.
The blocked gutter was held to constitute a nuisance, and the city
was liable for damages caused by it.
[A] municipal corporation has no more right to erect and
maintain a nuisance than a private individual.1
Other cases have indicated as follows:
A municipal corporation is no more exempt from liability
in case it creates a nuisance, either public or private, than an
individual.
12
When a city creates a nuisance, it is not exercising a
governmental function, but it is doing something forbidden
by law.
13
It has been decided many times in this court that negli-
gence in the performance of a governmental function by the
officers or agents of a municipality does not give a right of
action.... The exception to this rule is that a municipality may
not maintain a public nuisance even where it is performing a
public duty. 4
However, in Folk v. City of Milwaukee15 the court stated that the
municipality can be liable only if it were acting in a proprietary
relation to the person injured. In that case a child attending school
became sickened by escaping gases from a defective sewer under the
school building and allegedly died thereform. The court held that
the city was immune without deciding whether the condition which
caused the injury amounted to a nuisance. In Erickson v. Village of
West Salem'8 a child was playing in a village park at a pool of water
formed from the overflow of a drainage ditch which passed through
9 Harper v. City of Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 365 (1872) ; Gilluly v. City of Madison,
63 Wis. 518, 24 N.W. 137 (1885) ; Hughes v. City of Fond du Lac, 73 Wis.
380, 41 N.W. 407 (1889); Jensen v. Town of Oconto Falls, 186 Wis. 386, 202
N.W. 676 (1925).
2030 Wis. 365 (1872).
1 Id. at 372.
12 Hughes v. City of Fond du Lac, 73 Wis. 380, 383, 41 N.W. 407 (1889). The
case involved a public nuisance. A roller, "an unsightly object, naturally cal-
culated to frighten horses," was left standing in the street overnight. The city
was held liable for injury caused when the fright of his horse caused the
plaintiff to be thrown from his carriage.
13Bruhnke v. La Crosse, 155 Wis. 485, 488, 144 N.W. 1100 (1914). The city's
operation of a wagon with a dumping device which made it attractive to chil-
dren did not constitute a nuisance in fact.
14Bernstein v. City of Milwaukee, 158 Wis. 576, 578, 149 N.W. 381 (1914).
Nuisance was not involved in this case.
'2 108 Wis. 359, 84 N.W. 420 (1900).
16 205 Wis. 107, 236 N.W. 579 (1931).
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the park. He slipped in and was drowned. The plaintiff, the child's
father, contended that there was an exception to the non-liability
of municipalities in the case of nuisance and that municipalities are
liable for damages caused by the crelation or maintenance of nuis-
ances, whether in the performance of governmental or proprietary
functions, to the same extent as private individuals. The court de-
cided to the contrary. It recognized the broad language of the earlier
cases, but held that such language should have no broader applica-
tion than the facts of the cases in which they appeared. Upon analyz-
ing these facts the court concluded that they involved municipal ac-
tivity which was either unlawful, or performed in a proprietary
capacity.
In Virovatz v. City of Cudahf 7 it was expressly decided that a
municipality could not be held liable for maintaining a nuisance
in a case where its relation to the injured person was that of gover-
nor to governed. The city maintained a public swimming pond in
which there was some sort of hidden hole or trap. The court found
that this condition constituted a nuisance to those swimming there.
However, the city could not be held liable for a drowning caused
by the existence of the nuisance. The child who was drowned was
availing himself of the facility provided by the city at the time of
injury; the relationship was that of governor to governed. The court
held that where the relationship of the municipality to the person
injured is that of governor to governed, the former is immune from
liability, even though the injury was caused by a nuisance main-
tained by the municipality. Language to the contrary in earlier cases
was overruled as dicta.
On the other hand, a case soon arose in which the municipal
function was governmental, but the relationship was not that of
governor to governed. (The court sometimes uses the term "gover-
nor and governed.") The leading case holding that the municipality
could be liable in such a situation was Robb v. City of Milwaukee. s
Here a pedestrian walking past a public park was struck by a ball.
The closeness of the ball field to the sidewalk without a sufficient
protective fence was found to have constituted a continuing danger,
a nuisance, to persons walking past the park. The majority held that
since the plaintiff was not availing herself of the park facilities at
the time she was injured, her relationship to the municipality was
not that of governor to governed. The city was held liable. It is
interesting to note that the court found not only that there was no
governor and governed relationship, but also that the relationship
17 211 Wis. 357, 247 N.W. 341 (1933).
18 241 Wis. 432, 6 N.W. 2d 653 (1942).
19 Holl v. City of Merrill, 251 Wis. 203, 28 N.W. 2d 363 (1947).
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was akin to that of proprietor to proprietor. In the Folk case, which
apparently first gave rise to this limitation on nuisance liability, the
court suggested that the municipality could be liable only when its
relation to the person injured was proprietor to proprietor. In this
case the court seemed to say that if the relationship is not that of
governor to governed, it is that of proprietor to proprietor.
The Robb case was cited as precedent for holding a county liable
to a pedestrian who was injured when she stumbled over a defect in
the sidewalk next to the county jail. The county was not in a gover-
nor to governed relationship to the injured plaintiff since she, of
course, was not using the jail at the time. The county was no more
immune from liability for the injury than any other landowner.
Later decisions have limited these two cases by noting that there
must be a continuing and obvious hazard in order to find liability
on the part of the municipality.2"
B. Proprietor to proprietor relationship
While this rule (that a municipality would be immune from
liability for creating or maintaining a nuisance where the relation-
ship between the parties is governor to governed) was evolving,
the rule of liability of the municipality where the relationship was
proprietor to proprietor appears to have remained steadfast. In the
latter instance, maintenance of a nuisance which causes damage to
a party to whom a city was acting as one proprietor to another, will
result in liability. In a case where a city, as it graded the street,
pushed earth onto the plaintiff's premises, the city was held liable
for the damages.22
That work was done in an improper or negligent manner,
so as to invade the rights of the plaintiffs, not as members of
the public, but as adjoining proprietors. Toward them the
city's act was not governmental, but proprietary.23
It seems that even if the municipal function is generally con-
sidered governmental in character, it may be deemed proprietary
if the party plaintiff has an obvious proprietary status.2 4 When a
municipality takes charge of land, as in maintaining streets and
highways, 22 sewage disposal plants and dumps,26 city parks and
26Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Columbia County, 3 Wis. 2d 1, 87 N.W. 2d
279 (1957).
21 "The doctrine of liability of a municipal corporation in cases where the rela-
tion is that of one proprietor to another is so well entrenched in the juris-
prudence of the state that it cannot be disturbed." Young v. Juneau County,
192 Wis. 646, 652, 212 N.W. 295 (1927).
22 Bunker v. City of Hudson, 122 Wis. 43, 99 N.W. 448 (1904).
23Id. at 54.
24 Winchell v. The City of Waukesha, 110 Wis. 101, 85 N.W. 668 (1901) ; Young
v. Juneau County, 192 Wis. 646, 212 N.W. 295 (1927).
25 Matson v. Dane County, 172 Wis. 522, 179 N.W. 774 (1920) ; Stockstad v. Town
of Rutland, 8 Wis. 2d 528, 99 N.W. 2d 813 (1959).
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stadiums, 27 it is considered to be performing a governmental func-
tion, at least in Wisconsin. But if these activities create a nuisance
causing damage to neighboring landowners, as to those landowners,
the function is considered proprietary. The municipality i s t h en
considered in the same position as a landowner with respect to
possible liability. Of course it is held to no higher standard than an-
other landowner; for example, a town has the same right to divert
the natural flow of mere surface water as owners of private prop-
erty. There will be no liability for building a structure which causes
surface water to back up onto the land of a neighbor . 2
Some states have limited the nuisance exception to municipal
common law immunity by applying liability only for injuries to
real property.2 9 Wisconsin, however, has not adopted such a limita-
tion. Once the existence of the nuisance and the proper relationship
to the municipality has been established, a municipality could be
held liable for any type of injury caused by the nuisance.3 0 Thus, in
cases where the negligent construction of a culvert has caused water
to back up on adjoining land, the municipality has been held liable
for drownings in a pool thereby formed on an adjoining farm,3x or
for illness from drinking from a well contaminated by the backed
up water.
3 2
In Thompson v. City of Eau Claire33 the court expressed quite
clearly just what is encompassed within the term "proprietor to
proprietor relationship":
When speaking of the relationship of proprietor to proprie-
tor the courts are referring to proprietors of land. Generally the
rule applied between adjoining landowners. Th word "propri-
etors" is sufficiently broad to include owners and others with
a definite interest in the land that is less than that of owner.
The word "adjoining" is not limited to abutting lands but
also covers adjacent or neighboring lands.-
II. RECENT REFINEMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF
"GovERNOR TO GOVERNED RELATIONSHIP"
The last mentioned case 35 poses an interesting problem. The city
was found to have maintained a nuisance because of the condition
of the city dump. When fire spread from the dump and destroyed
26 Briggson v. City of Viroqua, 264 Wis. 47, 58 N.W. 2d 546 (1953) ; Thompson
v. City of Eau Claire, 269 Wis. 76, 69 N.W. 2d 237, 24 A.L.R. 2d 241 (1955).27Hoepner v. City of Eau Claire, 264 Wis. 608, 60 N.W. 2d 392 (1953) ; Blake
v. City of Madison, 237 Wis. 498, 297 N.W. 422 (1941).
28 Lloyd v. Chippewa County, 265 Wis. 293, 61 N.W. 2d 479 (1953).
29 Cf. City of Decatur v. Parkham, 268 Ala. 585, 109 So. 2d 692 (1959).
30 Supra note 25.
31 Matson v. Dane County, supra note 25.
32 Stockstad v. Town of Rutland, supra note 25.
33 269 Wis. 76, 69 N.W. 2d 237, 24 A.L.R. 2d 241 (1955).
34 Id. at 82.
35 Thompson v. City of Eau Claire, supra note 26.
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the plaintiff's nearby home, the city was held liable. The plaintiff did
not live within the city limits, but his own rubbish collector refused
his refuse at the city dump. Problem-what would be the result if
there was found to be both a proprietor to proprietor relationship
and at the same time a governor to governed relationship between
the city and the injured party? To answer the problem it would
seem best to note how recent decisions have defined the concept of
the "governor to governed relationship."
The relationship exists where the injured party at the time of injury
was "enjoying the benefit of a particular governmental activity
which resulted in the injury"36 or was "using the public facility for
the purpose for which it is intended."37 The person drowned while
swimming in a municipal pool,38 or the person injured while playing
ball in a city park,39 or the person injured while sliding down a munici-
pal toboggan slide 40 is making use of the facility at the time of injury
and is therefore in a relationship of governed to governor to the munici-
pality. In a recent case where a child playing on the sidewalk was
burned by a kerosene warning lantern set out to mark a defect in the
sidewalk, 41 the court did not have to decide whether leaving the lanterns
burning in broad daylight constituted a nuisance. The city was in a
governor to governed relationship to the little girl because she was
using the sidewalk for one of the purposes intended. The nuisance,
if any, was brought about by the manner in which the sidewalk was
maintained. A pedestrian injured by some defect in the street is in
the relation of governed to governor. 42 But if the injury to the
pedestrian is caused by some nuisance other than a defect in the
street, and the pedestrian is not making use of the service or facility
which brought about the nuisance, as in the Robb case, then the
relationship is not that of governor and governed. The use of the
municipal facility which caused the injury at the time of injury is
the "nexus" necessary to establish the relation of governor to gov-
erned. 43 Children playing at a municipal-maintained place or on muni-
cipal-owned machinery, neither of which were ever intended as places
of play, are not in such relationship."
6 Flamingo v. City of Waukesha, 262 Wis. 219, 226, 55 N.W. 2d 24 (1952).
37 Hoepner, v. City of Eau Claire, supra note 27.3sVirovatz v. City of Cudahy, 211 Wis. 357, 247 N.W. 341 (1933).
39 Supra note 37.4 0 Pohland v. City of Sheboygan, 251 Wis. 20, 27 N.W. 2d 736 (1947).
41 Smith v. City of Jefferson, 8 Wis. 2d 378, 99 N.W. 2d 119 (1959).42Laffey v. City of Milwaukee, 4 Wis. 2d 111, 89 N.W. 2d 801 (1958).
4 Supra note 18.
"4The child injured while playing on a municipal road grader which has been
parked in a vacant lot for the night, Britten v. City of Eau Claire, 260 Wis.
382, 51 N.W. 2d (1951), or on a mound of snow piled up from the plowing
of city streets, Flamingo v. City of Waukesha, 262 Wis. 219, 55 N.W. 2d(1952), or in a village dump, Champeau v. Village of Little Chute, 275 Wis.
[Vol. 45
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The court does not speak in terms of incidental benefit from the
facility, but of specific benefit derived from the use of the municipal
facility at the time of injury. There seem to be two requisites to
the finding of a governor to governed relationship:
1. the injured party must have been making use of the mu-
nicipal facility at the time of injury.
2. the particular facility must be the one out of which arose the
nuisance which caused the injury.
From time to time the court has expressed the opinion that the
distinction is rather arbitrary, and that it could lead to unjust re-
sults. 45 However, it is still the law. Several cases have stated that
any change must be made by the legislature.4 6
The problem posed at the beginning of this section cannot arise.
The municipality cannot be in a proprietor to proprietor and at the
same time a governor to governed relationship with the injured
party. If the injured party is making use of the facility which caused
the injury at the time of injury, he is injured as one of the governed.
The fact that he may also be in a relationship of proprietor to pro-
prietor to the municipality for other purposes is immaterial.
III. MUNIcIPAL LIAmLITY WHEN THERE Is No IMMUNITY
A. Causation
Once it has been determined that the municipality is not im-
mune from liability in a particular fact situation, liability does not
follow by merely showing the existence of a nuisance maintained
by the municipality and damages. Causation must still be proven.
In Champeau v. Village of Little Chute47 the condition of the village
dump, (in which a boy was burned while setting fire to discarded
fuel) might easily have been found to constitute a nuisance. It fre-
quently caught fire; litter and unpleas~ht odors spread to surround-
ing private property; and it was a haven for rats and flies. However, the
relationship between the village and the boy who was playing there
was not governor to governed and the village was not liable.
We consider that the "nuisance exception" to the general
rule which exempts municipalities from liability for injuries
caused by their negligence in the performance of governmen-
tal functions demands a showing not only that a nuisance was
created, but that those acts or defaults which caused the
257, 81 N.W. 2d 562 (1957), is not using the facility for the purpose for which
it was intended, and is therefore not in a governor to governed relationship
with the municipality.
4 Britten v. City of Eau Claire, 260 Wis. 382, 51 N.W. 2d 30 (1951) ; Young v.
Juneau County, 192 Wis. 646, 212 N.W. 295 (1927).46 Apfelbacher v. State, 160 Wis. 565, 152 N.W. 144 (1915) ; Erickson v. Village
of West Salem, 205 Wis. 107, 236 N.W. 579 (1931).
47 275 Wis. 257, 81 N.W. 2d 562 (1957).
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nuisance to exist also had a causal connection with the injury
complained of.48
Abatement of the above conditions would not have prevented
this injury.
B. Defenses
A nuisance can be created and maintained by conduct which is
either intentional or negligent. Since it appears (at least to this
writer) the most, if not all public nuisances created or maintained
by a municipality arise by reason of negligent conduct, the question
of affirmative defenses takes on considerable importance.
In a case involving an individual defendant, the Wisconsin Court
has held that contributory negligence is a defense to an action based
on nuisance where the conduct creating it was negligent. 9 The
court borrowed the reasoning from a New York decision 50 in which
Justice Cardozza determined that whenever a nuisance has its origin
in negligence the person injured should not be allowed to avert the
consequences of his own contributory negligence by affixing to the
negligence of the wrongdoer the label of "nuisance." The plaintiff
could have brought his action in either negligence or nuisance. "It
would be intolerable if the choice of a name were to condition lia-
bility."' 51 The particular case involved a question of the liability of
a municipality for damages caused when plaintiff was injured by
falling on a defective sidewalk.
The rule in Wisconsin then is that an individual defendant has
available the same affirmative defenses (e.g., contributory negli-
gence, assumption of risk) to an action for nuisance created or
maintained by negligent conduct as he would have to an action for
negligence alone. 52 Although the question has never been decided
in Wisconsin, there seems to be no logical reason why these defenses
should not be available to the municipality in an action for damages
caused by a nuisance occasioned by the negligent conduct of mu-
nicipal employees.5 3
It might be noted that the Wisconsin court, through Justice
Wingert, has called nuisance little more than a label,54 a name to
be used after it has been determined upon the facts that there should
be liability.55 Yet the court has held that the concept of nuisance
4s Id. at 260.
41 Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., supra note 5.50 McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E. 391 (1928).
51 Id. at 392.
52 Supra note 49.53 Although in Thompson v. City of Eau Elaire, supra note 35, Justice Broadfoot
noted that if negligence were a factor in that action against a municipality,
there was no evidence of contributory negligence.
54 Bratonja v. City of Milwaukee, 3 Wis. 2d 120, 87 N.W. 2d 775 (1958).
55 Wisconsin Power and Light Co. v. Columbia County, 3 Wis. 2d 1, 87 N.W. 2d
279 (1957).
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has enough substance to be distinguishable from negligence, 5 and
the choice of bringing an action in nuisance rather than in negligence
can, as noted above, be the determining factor for deciding whether
the municipality should enjoy governmental immunity.
IV. WISCONSIN STATUTES
There are some situations in which the legislature has stepped
in to provide a statutory remedy where the injured party might
otherwise have sought his remedy in nuisance. A person injured on
a public highway has been provided a remedy by Wisconsin Statute
section 81.15 (1959) which imposes liability for tort upon any town,
city, village or county for "insufficiency and want of repair" of their
highways. The section has been construed to cover streets and side-
walks as well as "highways. ' 57 Since the statute is in derogation of
common law governmental immunity it is strictly construed; the
test of liability is whether the highway was "insufficient" or in
"want of repair" within the meaning of the statute.58 The statute is
not applicable where the injury was occasioned by the active negli-
gence of a municipal employee, for instance, where a bridge tender
raises a drawbridge without warning those on or approaching the
bridge.59 Contributory negligence and comparative negligence ap-
ply to an action under section 81.15 since it is in legal contemplation an
action for negligence.6 0
On several occasions after determining that the municipality
is immune from liability for nuisance, the court has remanded the
case suggesting that there might be liability under this section.6
The remedy is available only to those who are using the highway
or sidewalk for the purpose of travel when injured. The definition
of "traveler" has been construed as broadly for the purposes of the
statute as the term has been construed in those cases finding a gov-
ernor to governed relationship blocking nuisance liability. For ex-
ample, a child playing on the sidewalk is a "traveler. ' '62
It has been held that the liability of a municipality for injuries
sustained by reason of defects in streets or public sidewalks is solely
statutory under section 81.15 for insufficiency and want of repair.
56 Bell v. Gray-Robinson Construction Co., 265 Wis. 652, 62 N.W. 2d 390 (1953).
57 Smith v. City of Jefferson, 8 Wis. 2d 378, 99 N.W. 2d 119 (1959); Francke
v. City of West Bend, 12 Wis. 2d 574, - N.W. 2d-(1961).
58 Morley v. City of Reedsburg, 211 Wis. 504, 248 N.W. 431 (1933).
59 Bremer v. City of Milwaukee, 166 Wis. 164, 164 N.W. 840 (1917).
60 Hales v. City of Wauwatosa, 275 Wis. 445, 82 N.W. 2d 301 (1957).
61 Smith v. City of Jefferson, 8 Wis. 2d 378, 99 N.W. 2d 119 (1959); Francke v.
City of West Bend, 12 Wis. 2d 574,-N.W. 2d-(1961). In this last case
the plaintiff fell into an unmarked open manhole, but his action in nuisance
was blocked because of the governor to governed relationship. In Ziegler v.
City of West Bend, 102 Wis. 17, 78 N.W. 164 (1899) an improperly fitted
cover slipped off the manhole as the plaintiff stepped on it and he fell into it.62 Supra note 41.
1961]
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Where the defect was held not substantial enough to constitute an in-
sufficiency or want of repair under this statute, it was held that it
could not logically amount to a nuisance.6 3
The Wisconsin Safe Place Statute64 has eliminated the immunity
doctrine so far as "public structures" and "places of employment"
of municipal corporations are concerned. 5
V. CONCLUSION
Wisconsin apparently considers that nuisance liability stands as
an exception to the doctrine of tort immunity of municipalities, as
do the majority of jurisdictions. 6  The Wisconsin court has set up
a rather unique qualification to this exception. If the relationship
between the municipality and the person injured was that of gov-
ernor to governed at the time of injury, the nuisance will not be an
exception to immunity. It thus becomes necessary to determine the
character not only of the function of the municipality (i.e., capacity
in which it was acting), but also of the relationship between the
municipality and the party injured.
In analyzing a fact situation to determine whether the munici-
pality will be immune from liability for damages caused by nuisance
the following results will occur:
1. If it was a corporate or proprietary function of the mu-
nicipality which occasioned the nuisance, the municipality
will not be immune from liability.
2. Even if the function is generally considered governmental
in character, as to one in a proprietor to proprietor rela-
tionship with the municipality, it will be regarded as a
proprietary function. The municipality will not be immune.
3. If the function is governmental in character, but there is
no governor to governed relationship between the munici-
pality and the injured party, there is no immunity.
4. If the function is governmental and the relationship is that
of governor to governed, the municipality is immune from
liability.
As the law stands today, in an action for damages against a
municipality there is an advantage in showing that the injury was
caused by a nuisance. One alleging only negligence will find himself
blocked by the doctrine of municipal immunity. But if it can be
shown that the negligence resulted in a nuisance which caused the
damage, the problem of municipal immunity might be overcome.
It is only in the case of a governor to governed relationship between
63 Lindemeyer v. City of Milwaukee, 241 Wis. 637, 6 N.W. 2d 653 (1942).
64 Wis. Stat. §§101.01, 101.06 (1959).
65 Heiden v. City of Milwaukee, 226 Wis. 92, 275 N.W. 922 (1937); Flesch v.
City of Lancaster, 264 Wis. 234, 58 N.W. 2d 710 (1953).6 6 Annot., 56 A.L.R. 2d 1415 (1957).
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the municipality and the plaintiff that the immunity doctrine con-
tinues to pose a problem to an action based on nuisance.
It could be argued that even this last stronghold of municipal
immunity should be dropped in actions based on nuisance. The
distinction based upon the relationship of the parties at the time of
injury is arbitrary, and as has been pointed out by the court itself,
could lead to absurd and unjust results.6 7
If a city creates or maintains a condition that is dangerous to
children, what logical reason is there for holding that the municipal-
ity is immune in those cases where children should be expected to
be present, when it is not immune in unexpected situations? The
city should expect that children will play in a city park6s or on a
public sidewalk,6 yet if the dangerous condition occurs in these places
the relationship is that of governor to governed. But children
are not expected to play on unattended road graders,7 0 or in the
village dump,71 or at dangerous conditions on their own property.7 2
Yet in the latter case there is no immunity. A dangerous condition
which arises because of the manner in which a city park is main-
tained cannot be the basis of liability for one using park facilities.7 3
It can be, if the person injured was not using the park at the time
of injury.7 4
It should be noted that a "governor to governed relationship"
could be covering a defense of assumption of risk in many cases
where the nuisance arose because of negligent conduct. But if there
67 In Young v. Juneau County, 192 Wis. 646, 212 N.W. 295 (1927) Justice Rosen-
berry recognized that a rule of non-liability where the relation is governor to
governed and liability where the relationship is that of one proprietor to an-
other might lead to "devious" results if pushed to the extreme. He gave his
famous example of the burning haystacks: If sparks from highway equip-
ment should ignite a haystack in a neighboring field there could be liability,
but if the haystack is placed on a wagon being drawn along the highway there
can be on a wagon being drawn along the highway there can be no liability.
A more shocking and actual example of resulting inconsistency is seen in the
comparison of Matson v. Dane County, supra note 25, where there was liability
for drownings caused by a pool of water negligently allowed to form on a
neighboring farm and become a nuisance, while in the case where the pool
formed in a city park where children were expected to play and maintenance
of the nuisance created a specific hazard to them, there could be no liability
for the drowning of a child playing there. Erickson v. Village of West Salem,
supra note 16. In Britten v. City of Ean Claire, supra note 45, a case involving
attractive nuisance, the court stated that the doctrine of municipal immunity
rested on a weak foundation but hesitated to abandon it because of its long
standing. By simply determining that the city, in leaving a road grader in an
empty lot, was acting in a proprietary capacity, there being no precedent to the
contrary, the court sidestepped the immunity doctrine. Such ad hoc determina-
tions have been the cause of the confusion in the area of municipal tort liability.
68 Supra note 37.
69 Supra note 41.
TO Britten v. City of Eau Claire, supra note 45.
71 Champean v. Village of Little Chute 275 Wis. 257, 81 N.W. 2d 562 (1956).
72asnv. Dane County, supra note 25'.
7 Supra note 37.
,
4 Robb v. City of Milwaukee, supra note 18.
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is such a defense it can be proven; it need not be protected under
a blanket of municipal immunity.
Several recent decisions from other jurisdictions indicate that
the doctrine of tort immunity of municipalities is weakening. At least
three jurisdictions have dropped municipal immunity.75 The Illinois
court considered that it had the power to drop the doctrine of mu-
nicipal immunity, apparently on the belief that it was not part of
the common law. A vigorous dissent was based upon a legislative
act which made the common law the law of the state. Although
the Wisconsin court has repeatedly spoken against the doctrine of
municipal tort immunity, it has always concluded that the legislature
alone has power to change the rule.16
The Wisconsin court recently dropped the doctrine of charitable
immunity, at least in cases where a paying patient is seeking re-
covery for negligence.7 7 However, before making the decision the
court pointed out that the doctrine was court made and therefore
could be changed by the court. The tort immunity of municipal cor-
porations perhaps rests on firmer ground. If it was accepted as part
of the common law, then the Wisconsin constitution may prevent its
change by the court.7 8
WILLIAM MAYNE HAYDEN
75 Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957). The Florida
court recognized the incongruities and confusion caused by the attempt to
"prune and pare the rule of immunity rather than uproot it." It was held that
a municipality could be held liable for wrongful death caused by the negligence
of a city jailor. California has dropped immunity of at least quasi-municipal
corporations, hospital districts, in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District,
- Cal. - 359 P.2d 457 (1961). Illinois dropped the rule as to municipal
corporations in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18
Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E. 2d 89 (1959). These courts faced most of the arguments
which the Wisconsin Court would encounter in considering whether to drop
municipal immunity: the archaic rule of sovereign immunity, that the rule
is part of the common law and may only be changed by the legislature, that
previous cases have said any change must come from the legislature, that the
legislature has abrogated immunity for certain situations thereby indicating
an intent to keep it for all other cases, and that the rule has been too long
standing to be dropped.
76 Supra note 45.
77Kojis v. Doctors Hospital, 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W. 2d 131 (1961). In a
supplemental opinion the court made it clear that the ruling was made pros-pective from the date of filing of the decision except as to that immediate
case.
78 Wis. Const. Art. XIV, sec. 13.
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